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ABSTRACT
Mobile ad hoc networks have inherently very diﬀerent prop-
erties to conventional networks. These new characteristics
present major security vulnerabilities; in particular, one side
eﬀect of the unique way in which routing protocols operate
in ad hoc networks is that many new threats arise. Self-
ish nodes are those which do not perform certain opera-
tions that the protocol speciﬁes that they should, through a
wish to conserve power. Malicious nodes may deliberately
disrupt the network using a variety of attacks. This paper
discusses reputation mechanisms which have been suggested
as a means to mitigate the detrimental eﬀect of selﬁsh and
malicious nodes. This paper reveals reasons why complex
reputation systems may be too ineﬃcient to use in a mo-
bile ad hoc network, where resources are limited. However,
suggestions are also made to show how a simple reputation
system might be used to enhance the robustness of ad hoc
networks.
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile ad hoc networks have inherently very diﬀerent
properties to conventional networks. An ad hoc network is a
collection of nodes forming a temporary or permanent net-
work without any support from centralised services. Within
a wireless network, a node’s transmission range will typi-
cally not cover the whole network, so end-to-end commu-
nication may require routing information via several nodes.
This is why ad hoc networks are sometimes referred to as
multi-hop networks, where a hop is a direct link between two
nodes. Such systems have a variety of security issues, many
of which are diﬀerent to the issues surrounding conventional
wired networks. Reputation systems have been suggested
as a tool to resolve some of the security issues associated
with ad hoc network routing. This paper discusses the ef-
fectiveness of applying reputation systems to mobile ad hoc
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networks, where resources can be limited.
Section 2 introduces the security issues in ad hoc net-
works. Section 3 give an overview of reputation systems and
how they have been applied to ad hoc networks. Section 4
discusses the use of reputation systems, analysing how repu-
tations are calculated and how they are distributed. Section
5 suggests how simple reputation systems can be used to
help improve the security of ad hoc networks. Finally, sec-
tion 6 concludes the paper.
The following terms are used in this document, but may
be used diﬀerently elsewhere. A node is a device which has a
network interface participating in routing in a mobile ad hoc
network. It may or may not be mobile, and may also be part
of another network. It is important to realise that a node
can actually be a large network, or it could just be a single
mobile device such as a mobile phone. An originator node is
a node which originates a data packet, intended for a certain
destination node. A node is a neighbour node of another
node if it is only one hop away and within direct transmission
range. If the destination node is not a neighbour node of
the originator node, the data packet will have to traverse
a multi-hop route consisting of intermediate nodes. In a
speciﬁc scenario, the sending node is the last node to have
forwarded the data packet. A service is deﬁned as an action
that a node requests from, or performs for, its neighbour
node.
2. SECURITY ISSUES
The lack of infrastructure management in an ad hoc net-
work gives problems with the provision of any security ser-
vices, which are typically centrally controlled in conventional
wired networks. For example, access control is a service tra-
ditionally maintained by a central server, controlling various
resources belonging to the network nodes. In an ad hoc net-
work context, such a service may be required to help prevent
unauthorised principals interfering with a private network.
Security mechanisms involving trusted third parties may
no longer be viable in ad hoc networks. As nodes are mobile,
continually entering and leaving the ad hoc network, a dy-
namic topology means that security will have to be scalable
and cope with frequent link breaks. This will be of partic-
ular importance in safety applications, where availability is
key. For example, if safety-critical data is to be sent, then
it is imperative that the information is reliably and speed-
ily delivered. As communication uses wireless technology,
bandwidth will often be limited, as may be transmission en-
ergy. These constraints introduce issues with heterogeneous
networking, where resource-intensive security mechanisms
may not work in an ad hoc environment.
One of the key research areas in mobile ad hoc networks is
setting up and maintaining the ad hoc infrastructure through
the use of routing protocols. Existing network layer proto-
cols are likely to be too resource intensive to be suitable for
ad hoc network use, so solutions using a variety of diﬀerent
methods have been proposed. One side eﬀect of the unique
way in which these routing protocols work is that many more
threats now exist. In an earlier paper [9], a threat model for
ad hoc routing protocols was described, classifying inter-
nal attacks into four categories — failed, badly failed, self-
ish, and malicious nodes. Failed and selﬁsh nodes are those
which do not perform certain operations that the protocol
speciﬁes that they should, the former due to some unforeseen
failure and the latter due to selﬁshness to conserve power.
Badly failed nodes may perform operations incorrectly, in-
troducing false and misleading information into the network.
Malicious nodes may deliberately disrupt the network using
a variety of attacks.
3. REPUTATION MECHANISMS
Reputation mechanisms, the main focus of this paper,
have been proposed for use within ad hoc networks to ad-
dress some of the threats arising from misbehaving network
nodes. These mechanisms, explored in more detail immedi-
ately below, are potentially of particular value in addressing
the threats arising from selﬁsh nodes. In the context of an ad
hoc network, these mechanisms seek to dynamically assess
the trustworthiness of neighbouring network nodes, with a
view to excluding untrustworthy nodes.
The use of reputation systems in many diﬀerent areas of
IT is increasing1, not least because of their widely publicised
use in online auctions and product reviews, see, for example
eBay and Amazon [8]. Mui et al. [6] give many examples of
how reputation systems are used.
Reputation systems are used to decide who to trust, and
to encourage trustworthy behaviour. Resnick and Zeck-
hauser [7] identify three goals for reputation systems:
1. To provide information to distinguish between a trust-
worthy principal and an untrustworthy principal,
2. To encourage principals to act in a trustworthy man-
ner, and
3. To discourage untrustworthy principals from partici-
pating in the service the reputation mechanism is present
to protect.
Reputation systems rely on principals monitoring sequences
of transactions with other principals, and on communica-
tions between principals that are willing to take part in the
reputation system. Each principal maintains a reputation
value for some subset of the other principals in the system
— these values may be shared between principals or may be
unique for each participant. The precise meaning of the rep-
utation value, how it is calculated and updated, and how it
is communicated between parties, are all system-dependent.
1The Reputations Research Network is a web
site for discussing reputation system research at
databases.si.umich.edu/reputations/index.html 
However, it is generally true that this value is intended in
some way to measure the trustworthiness of the principal,
at least for the purposes of the system concerned.
Two reputation mechanisms that have been proposed to
help protect ad hoc routing are the Cooperation of Nodes:
Fairness in Dynamic Ad-Hoc NeTworks (CONFIDANT) pro-
tocol [1], and the Collaborative Reputation Mechanism (CORE)
protocol [5], which work in a similar way. These two schemes
are now described in more detail.
3.1 An Overview of CORE
Michiardi and Molva [5] deﬁne an ad hoc network as a
community where each member has to contribute to its run-
ning to remain trusted. Any member not contributing will
ﬁnd their reputation worsening until they are gradually ex-
cluded from the operation of the network because of their
bad reputation.
3.1.1 Reputation Values
CORE deﬁnes three types of reputation, which are com-
bined to form a global reputation value for a community
member. Each calculation is normalised so that a reputation
ranges from –1 (bad) to +1 (good). 0 represents a neutral
view, and this is used when there are not enough observa-
tions to make an accurate assessment of a node’s reputation.
The three reputation types are as follows:
• S ubj ectiv e r eputation is locally calculated, where node
A calculates the reputation of a neighbour node B at a
given time for a particular function. More emphasis is
given to past behaviour than current behaviour. Plac-
ing more weight on past observations prevents subjec-
tive reputation being inﬂuenced by sporadically cor-rect be
haviour.
• I ndir ect r eputations are accepted by node A from
node  C about node  B. Only positive reputation values
are used, to eliminate an attack where a malicious node
transmits negative reputation information to cause a
denial-of-service.
• F unctional r eputations are related to a certain func-
tion, where each function is given a weight as to its im-
portance. For example, data packet forwarding may be
deemed to be more important than forwarding packets
with route information, so data packet forwarding will
be given greater weight in the reputation calculations.
Reputation values in CORE are based on observations.
If the observed behaviour matches the expected behaviour
then the k-th observation will be positive. If not then the
k-th value is negative. To be able to perform this valida-
tion reliably is of extreme importance to the CORE scheme,
and the authors have suggested the Watchdog mechanism
[4] based on promiscuous observation2. The expected result
is stored in a buﬀer until a matching observation is made.
While the expected result is still present in the buﬀer, the
reputation relating to the observed function is gradually de-
creased.
2There are inherent problems with promiscuous observation
which are discussed in section 4.2.
3.1.2 The CORE Protocol
Each node maintains a reputation table. This table con-
sists of the reputations of other nodes, with each entry con-
sisting of a unique ID, recent subjective observations, re-
cent indirect observations and the composite reputation for
a given function. Thus a reputation table has to be main-
tained for each function that is to be monitored.
There are three ways in which a reputation table is up-
dated.
1. In the ﬁrst case, a node  A requests a service from node
B, but node  B refuses to perform the service. Thus
node  A will decrease its perceived reputation of node
B. This is a local calculation of node B’s subjective
reputation.
2. In the second case, a global distribution of reputation
takes place within a reputation dissemination phase.
This phase involves sending messages containing a list
of entities which have successfully cooperated in pro-
viding a function, i.e. a list of nodes with positive rep-
utations.
3. The ﬁnal case is where reputations are gradually de-
creased to a null value if there is no interaction with
the observed node.
When a node A, with a good reputation, is asked to per-
form a service by a node  B, who has a bad reputation, node
A can refuse to cooperate. In doing so, node  A is required
to send a message to all nodes in the ad hoc network, stat-
ing that it is denying service to node B. The neighbour
nodes of both A and  B must check that node B’s reputa-
tion is negative in their own reputation tables. If one of
the neighbour nodes does not agree with node A’s negative
reputation value for node  B, then this neighbour node de-
creases the reputation of node A, i.e. the node which sent
the denial-of-service message.
3.2 An Overview of CONFIDANT
The CONFIDANT protocol [1] is deﬁned as a collection
of components at a node which interact with each other to
provide and process protocol information. See ﬁgure 1 for
an overview of how these components interact.
Nodes in the CONFIDANT scheme rely on passive obser-
vation of all packets within a one-hop neighbourhood. This
view is maintained by the Monitor component. The Monitor
reports any suspicious events to the Trust Manager compo-
nent.
The Trust Manager makes decisions about providing or
accepting route information, accepting a node as part of a
route, or taking part in a route originated by another node.
The Trust Manager maintains a trust table indicating how
much other nodes in the network can be trusted to send cor-
rect ALARM messages. ALARM messages, which contain
the type and frequency of protocol violations, are recorded
in an alarm table. ALARM messages are sent to all nodes
in a ‘friends’ list whenever bad behaviour is experienced or
observed, or when other valid ALARM messages have been
received from trusted nodes. The level of trust assigned to
a node in the trust table is used as a weighted metric to de-
termine whether or not an ALARM message is credible, e.g.
two ALARMS from partially trusted nodes are equivalent
to one ALARM from a trusted node.
The Monitor and Trust Manager report suspicious events,
either from an ALARM message or direct observation, to the
Reputation System component. This component maintains
either a table of nodes and their reputation ratings3, or a
blacklist of nodes which the component believes are behav-
ing badly (or both). These ratings can only be changed if
there is suﬃcient evidence to indicate a change is needed,
i.e. evidence has been received at least a threshold number
of times. Evidence is weighted, in order from highest to low-
est, depending whether it results from personal experience,
from observed experience in the neighbourhood, or from re-
ported ALARM messages. If a rating drops out of a certain
range, the reputation system alerts the Path Manager.
The Path Manager ranks routes according to a security
metric. All paths which contain a badly behaving node are
deleted. The Path Manager also decides what to do with
route requests received from badly behaved nodes, e.g. by
ignoring the bad node, and what to do with route requests
for a bad node, e.g. it could alert the originator node.
4. THE APPLICABILITY OF REPUTATION
SYSTEMS
The previous two schemes are examples of reputation sys-
tems as applied to an ad hoc network environment. How-
ever, the reputation system itself potentially introduces many
new vulnerabilities. Quantifying reputation is very diﬃcult
and must be deﬁned in a very precise way, and distributing
reputation information in a reliable and secure manner is
particularly diﬃcult in ad hoc networks.
4.1 Analysis of the Reputation Value
Reputation can be deﬁned as one node’s perception of an-
other node with regard to performing some operation. Thus
the reputation value is used as a prediction of future quality
of service. However, reputation is not a tangible property, so
many diﬀerent deﬁnitions exist. Thus the reputation value
has to be explicitly deﬁned.
4.1.1 Calculating Reputation
Reputation values are inevitably based on observations
of multiple functions. In both CORE and CONFIDANT,
weightings are applied to these individual functional repu-
tation values to obtain a single ‘combined’ reputation value.
The CORE mechanism assumes that every node will use the
same reputation calculations and will also assign the same
weights to the same functions. This is a potentially inappro-
priate assumption in a multi-domain ad hoc network, where
devices with diﬀerent capabilities and roles are likely to want
to place diﬀerent levels of importance on diﬀerent functions.
Both CORE and CONFIDANT use global reputation val-
ues, i.e. each node maintains a single reputation value for
every other node with which it interacts, where this value
combines all the various functional reputation values. Issues
arise with use of such global reputation values. In particular,
a global reputation value may enable a node to hide bad be-
haviour with respect to one function by correctly supporting
3It is implicitly implied that this table is independent of the
similar table maintained by the Trust Manager. There is no
explicit deﬁnition of what a rating is and what value/s it
takes. The authors state that a node can be good or bad,
but they give no detailed deﬁnition on what is good and
what is bad.
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Figure 1: The interaction between the components of CONFIDANT.
another function. Thus, global reputation values do not re-
veal the importance placed on diﬀerent services by diﬀerent
nodes.
CORE and CONFIDANT calculate reputation values in
diﬀerent ways. CORE reputation values range from posi-
tive (+1), through null (0), to negative (-1). CONFIDANT,
however, only uses negative values. There are advantages
in both approaches. Having a positive to negative range al-
lows good behaviour to be rewarded and bad behaviour to
be punished. By placing more weight on past behaviour,
the CORE scheme is tolerant of sporadically bad behaviour.
Thus, if a node with a good reputation is only temporarily
unable to perform some function, e.g. because of environ-
mental conditions, it will not be punished severely. However,
such an approach is vulnerable to an attack where a node
can build up a good reputation before behaving maliciously
for a period. The better the reputation the malicious node
can build up, the more time the node will have in which it
can fail to meet its obligations while its reputation is still
positive. There is also an issue with the way CORE places
emphasis on past behaviour to eliminate sporadic activity,
since inconsistent behaviour should probably be penalised,
since it may be very damaging. Thus, while having a posi-
tive to negative range of reputations has advantages, placing
weight on past experience may lead to undesirable eﬀects.
This is an inherent fault with the reputation value used
in all systems, i.e. an assumption that past behaviour is as-
sumed to be indicative of future behaviour. Attacks involv-
ing ‘building up credit’ before behaving selﬁshly have less
eﬀect in CONFIDANT, as good behaviour is not rewarded,
so all nodes are always under suspicion of bad behaviour.
However, this makes CONFIDANT less tolerant of failed
nodes, which may be exhibiting failed behaviour due, for
example, to loss of power. In CONFIDANT, failed nodes
recover through timeouts, when their entries in the black-
lists expire and are deleted. This sudden leap back to a
well behaved status will, however, enable a malicious node
to repeat an attack.
Finally there is an issue regarding the possible negative
eﬀects of a reputation system on well-behaved nodes. A
node which has built up a good reputation for a service may
become a bottleneck in providing that service. This is an un-
wanted consequence of good reputation; the good node may
even wish to decrease its reputation by behaving badly to
prevent its resources being over-used. This would clearly be
undesirable. This can be mitigated by placing more weight
on unwanted behaviour than positive behaviour in the rep-
utation calculation, so that unwanted behaviour will change
the reputation value more than any desired behaviour.
4.1.2 Reputation and Identities
A reputation value should only be associated with one
node. Thus node identiﬁcation is a vitally important issue,
and one which has not yet been adequately addressed in the
literature. In order for reputations to be reliable, each node
in the ad hoc network has to be bound to one identiﬁer, so
that a node cannot change identity in order to get a new
reputation value.
The need for persistent identities will also depend on how
the system treats new nodes. Each reputation system has
a learning period, as the network will not know how a new
node will behave. Friedman and Resnick [3] present work on
discouraging new participants from malicious behaviour by
assigning them the lowest possible reputation value. They
argue that this promotes identity persistence in circumstances
where there exists the ability to change identities easily. If
a new node is allocated a low reputation rating initially, it
has to perform positive work to gain a good reputation, in
order that other nodes do not refuse service to the new node.
Thus, a node which changes its identity will automatically
lose any good reputation it has achieved.
Unfortunately, the use of this mechanism may not be fea-
sible in an ad hoc network, where instantaneous connection
is required. For example, in the accident data reporting
example, the delays introduced by such a scheme would be
unacceptable. Thus both CONFIDANT and CORE allocate
neutral reputations to new nodes. Assigning a null value is
a reasonable approach only if identity persistence can be
encouraged by some other means.
4.2 Detecting Unwanted Behaviour
In order for reputation values to be trusted, nodes will
need a reliable means of detecting good or bad behaviour.
The process that is chosen will have to be dependable, where
the objective is to eliminate subjectivity in the calculation of
the reputation value. This is problematic, as bad behaviour
by one node may be deﬁned as good behaviour by another
node. In the CORE scheme, for example, an access point
may refuse to forward a packet for a node because it has
not presented the correct authentication credentials. If the
node has a good reputation in the view of another observing
node, the observing node will deﬁne this action as selﬁsh
misbehaviour, and will decrease the reputation of the access
point.
This example also highlights how detecting unwanted be-
haviour is the responsibility of both the nodes directly in-
volved and the surrounding neighbour nodes. Both CON-
FIDANT and CORE rely on promiscuous observation for
monitoring operations such as packet forwarding. However,
passive observation presents several weaknesses when used
within a wireless ad hoc environment. Some of these have
been identiﬁed by Marti et al. [4].
Interoperability issues mean that in order to perform promis-
cuous observation the network hardware may have to be able
to listen and construct packets over diﬀerent radio trans-
mission technologies. This may not be possible for resource
constrained devices. Also, data packet collisions may occur
when two nodes try to transmit at the same time. Thus,
a node ‘listening’ for its packet to be forwarded may never
‘hear’ the packet, because a collision could have occurred
while its neighbour node was forwarding the packet. The
node receives no passive acknowledgement (i.e. does not see
the packet being forwarded) and hence decreases the reputa-
tion of its neighbour node, even though the neighbour node
successfully forwarded the packet. It may also be the case
that the forwarding node moves out of range of the origina-
tor node to deliver the packet, in which case the ‘listening’
node will never receive the passive acknowledgement. An
active acknowledgement mechanism would help to alleviate
these problems but will add more overhead, and it will not
solve the passive acknowledgement problems for neighbour
nodes which are not directly involved in a communication
between two of their other neighbours.
Reliance on promiscuous observation also limits a scheme’s
ability to function with other technologies such as directional
antennae and wired networks, where promiscuous observa-
tion cannot occur since the transmission of the forwarded
packet will never be received by a ‘listening’ node with just
a directional antenna. This would mean that nodes would
need an omni-directional antenna just for promiscuous ob-
servation, which would typically be uneconomic.
Detection can only occur if there is an event to detect.
Thus the reputation value is only useful when nodes com-
municate more than once. The reputation value becomes
more reliable as more communication takes place. CON-
FIDANT assumes that all nodes send the same amount of
packets at a constant rate4, i.e. each node performs the same
number of services for each other node. Thus there is noth-
ing to prevent a sleep deprivation torture attack where one
node constantly sends packets to another node to forward.
However, it is debatable as to whether or not this attack
should lie within the scope of reputation systems.
Another issue is detecting ‘selective misbehaviour’, where
a node deliberately seeks to minimise its use for routing
packets, i.e. it tries to ensure that it is not included in any
routes, whilst behaving correctly in other respects. By never
dropping packets which it ought to forward, it should never
receive a bad reputation (although it might also fail to re-
ceive a positive reputation). How this might be done will
depend on the routing protocol, but it could for example be
achieved by sending false or null responses to route request
messages.
4.3 Analysis of a Distributed Reputation System
Both CORE and CONFIDANT distribute reputation val-
ues to create a network global view of a node’s reputation.
Any bad behaviour directly experienced by a node will be
relayed to the whole network, so that bad behaviour is dis-
couraged more than if reputation remained local knowledge.
CORE requires nodes to send positive messages about co-
operative nodes, and messages about badly rated nodes who
are requesting services from good nodes. CONFIDANT
sends ALARMmessages, reporting any bad behaviour which
is experienced or observed.
Many of the problems faced by distributed reputation
schemes are the same as those faced by any other distributed
scheme. For example, reputation messages could be modi-
ﬁed or replayed. Moreover reputation messages may them-
selves be accidentally lost. As a result, there is a strong like-
lihood that serious inconsistencies will arise within a com-
munity as to the reputation values for nodes in the network.
If these inconsistencies can be exploited by other nodes, then
this is a serious vulnerability. Another important issue is the
volume of additional messages which may be needed to sup-
port the distributed system. As bandwidth may be very lim-
ited, the priority may be on using the available bandwidth
for emergency data rather than for reputation information.
Thus, it seems that CORE and CONFIDENT will be bet-
ter suited to ad hoc networks which use a proactive routing
protocol, so that reputation information can be piggybacked
on periodic route update information. If a global reputation
system was to be used with an ad hoc network based on a
reactive routing protocol, where information about unused
routes in not stored, then serious ineﬃciencies will arise.
The issue of storing information about every node in the net-
work is also important. To use CORE and CONFIDANT,
4CORE does not explicitly assume this, but it still suﬀers
from the same problems.
nodes will need a reasonable amount of storage space rel-
ative to the network size, as the systems require them to
store information relating to all nodes.
Finally we mention three types of behaviour which can
give rise to threats when reputation values are distributed
throughout an ad hoc network:
• Advertising a false high rating about another node,
• Advertising a false low rating about another node, and
• Negative discrimination, where a node refuses services
to only some nodes; this can be random or targeted at
certain nodes.
4.3.1 Advertising false high reputation values
Advertising a false high rating is an attack which can
be achieved in the CORE scheme, where malicious nodes
can send positive rating messages to boost the reputation of
nodes which have bad reputations. As noted in [5], the ma-
licious node itself has not gained any direct advantage, but
if it is in collusion with the badly rated nodes it has helped
then this indirect attack is potentially a genuine threat. An
example of a real world scenario is a user with a Personal
Area Network (PAN), who does not want all of the devices
in the PAN providing services in the ad hoc network. Thus
the user involves just one device, which relays positive in-
formation about the other devices in the PAN, so that they
all remain trusted and so that they can use the ad hoc net-
work to request services. CORE does give some protection,
in that subjective reputation has more weight than indirect
reputation in the reputation calculations.
The authors of CORE deliberately designed their scheme
to only allow positive reputation messages, to prevent ma-
licious nodes advertising unfairly low reputation ratings.
However, CORE still uses denial-of-service messages to re-
port nodes with bad reputations trying to access services
from good nodes. As mentioned above, neighbour nodes
must check that the reputation values contained within any
received denial-of-service messages correspond to the values
stored in their own reputation tables. If the values do not
match, the peer nodes decrease the reputation of the node
which sent the denial of service message. However, the fre-
quency of mismatches may be high, due to nodes moving in
and out of range of one another, and the diﬀerent assignment
of importance to diﬀerent functions, as outlined above.
4.3.2 Advertising false low reputation values
Transmitting false low reputation messages about a node
is a denial of service attack, where decreasing a node’s rep-
utation will result in good nodes refusing it service. In both
this and the previous attack, assurances will have to be given
to a node of the reliability of the reputation value, so the
node can decide the level of the risk before deciding whether
it is willing to accept the reputation value. CONFIDANT
tries to achieve this through a distributed trust mechanism,
which is used to ﬁlter false ALARM messages from true
ones. However, there are still some important issues.
CONFIDANT relies on trusting nodes to report bad be-
haviour. Two nodes with the same trust level could report
ALARMS about each other. It is not clear what will hap-
pen in this event, but a reasonable conclusion will be that
the ﬁrst node who manages to distribute enough ALARM
messages to exceed the reputation threshold will be trusted
ﬁrst. This attack would be easier for a node with a higher
level of trust, which could reduce the reputation of nodes
which have been assigned less trust. In view of this, the
reputation system may motivate nodes to retaliate against
ALARM messages, by targeting the node which originated
the ALARM messages. Retaliation can also be achieved by
conventional denial-of-service attacks such as sleep depriva-
tion torture. It could be the case that it is more advanta-
geous for a node to directly attack a node who is trying to
send ALARM messages, than to let the ALARM message
be processed so that its reputation is decreased.
Thus, the CONFIDANT scheme depends on how trust is
placed and managed. Trust could be deﬁned at a manufac-
turer level, or on an ownership level, for example. However,
it may be infeasible to use trust assigned in this way to de-
tect bad behaviour in an ad hoc network, which is vulnerable
to both malicious and non-malicious failures.
4.3.3 Discrimination
Negative discrimination is a very important attack to con-
sider. In a distributed system, a node could keep its overall
network reputation high by cooperating with more than a
certain of percentage of the nodes. This would suit attacks
such as partial dropping of packets by selﬁsh nodes.
There is also an issue with how the scheme does not dis-
criminate between failed and selﬁsh nodes, and between
badly failed and malicious nodes. For example, failed nodes
may fail because of factors outside of their control such as
not having enough resource to perform a service. A selﬁsh
node will not perform the service, even though it has the
resources to do so. CORE treats both types of nodes in the
same way. The problem is that there is no way for the failed
node to recover its reputation when it recovers from its own
problems, as no nodes will request services from the failed
node to enable it to perform well to increase its rating.
5. A SIMPLE REPUTATION MECHANISM
Dellarocus [2] and Friedman and Resnick [3] present a so-
lution to some of the above problems in the context of a con-
ventional reputation system; these solutions use ‘controlled
anonymity’ to mitigate the attacks. A malicious node can-
not send false reputation messages about another node if it
does not know the node’s true identity. While negative dis-
crimination is still possible, it cannot be targeted at certain
nodes. However, controlled anonymity requires some form
of central control which is not feasible in vehicular ad hoc
networks.
From the analysis in this paper, we can conclude that the
reputation value should relate to exactly one function. The
most reliable and quickest reputation values are those which
are directly derived from personal experience. Both good
and bad behaviour should inﬂuence the reputation value,
where greater weight is placed on bad behaviour.
It makes sense to restrict reputation systems to just local
calculations, due to the diﬃculties outlined above in syn-
chronising reputation data. Also, reputation information is
only going to be of use to the nodes in the area surrounding
the badly behaved node.
Thus the following is a localised simple reputation mech-
anism is proposed. A node maintains a reputation table
which consists of entries for every neighbour and their rep-
utation for performing a certain function. The reputation
value rep, is initially set to the variable startrep.
When a node requests a service from a neighbour, it gives
the neighbour x opportunities to respond, where initially x
is equal to rep. If the response is positive, x is increased by
changerep. While x is positive, the value of x should be re-
turned to the initial starting value after a timeout period, so
that the reputation has to be earned again5. After a certain
number of consecutive timeout periods where no negative
behaviour has occurred, the rep value should be increased
by changerep.
Where there is no response or the response is negative, x
is decreased by 2×changerep. The node should keep trying
until x reaches zero, when the corresponding rep value is
decreased by 2×changerep. In this event, the node should
look to request the service from a diﬀerent node. If later on,
the node wishes to try and request the service from the same
neighbour again, it performs the same algorithm, where the
rep value is less and thus the number x of opportunities is
now less, i.e. the neighbour is given less chances. The node
should perform exponential backoﬀ to allow the neighbour
to recover from any temporary problems.
Neighbour nodes should be given some chance of recovery.
Thus, if a node has no other option but to try a selﬁsh node,
the node can just request the service with an initial x value
of 1. This ,along with a decreasing rep value, results in less
resources being wasted on a neighbour which is selﬁsh or
failed. Also, to discourage unwanted behaviour, service re-
quests from nodes with reputation values below a threshold
should be ignored.
The variables startrep and changerep used in this algo-
rithm will have to be made subject to simulation tests to
discover the optimum values. It is likely that they will de-
pend on several factors including mobility and frequency of
failure.
The reputation value can be used as an indication of the
neighbour node’s ability to perform a service. Thus when
faced with several neighbours who oﬀer the same service, a
node can use the reputation value as a metric to inﬂuence
its decision.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Mobile ad hoc networks have a number of signiﬁcant se-
curity issues, especially those relating to inter-node rout-
ing. Various types of attack exist from nodes internal to
the network. Reputation systems are used to establish trust
and encourage trustworthy behaviour. CORE and CONFI-
DENT are two distributed reputation systems which have
been proposed to mitigate the eﬀects of internal threats in
ad hoc networks. Unfortunately, reputation systems have
inherent problems in the way the reputation value is deﬁned
and calculated, the detection of disreputable behaviour, and
the coordinated distribution of reputation information.
Ongoing research involving detailed simulations of spe-
ciﬁc proposals for reputation schemes will help decide the
way forward in this area. However, the advantages of repu-
tation systems can still be enjoyed in a localised mechanism,
where both positive and negative behaviour is included in
the reputation calculation. Negative behaviour should be
given greater weight than positive behaviour, so that when
it occurs it severely aﬀects the reputation value.
5This makes it more diﬃcult for a malicious attacker to
build up a good reputation to attack for a sustained period
of time.
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